NACCO Industries (NC) is a holding company with an interesting collection of operating businesses spread across four different and mostly unrelated product lines: lift trucks, household appliances, specialty kitchen retail, and coal mining. 

NC - Segment Overview

This odd conglomerate – with very different business models, growth stories, and margins – makes the stock’s financial performance much more difficult to analyze, a fact that is compounded by the lack of significant analyst coverage.

Yet at current price levels, investors are getting a company with a long-history of cash flow generation, at a price which basically throws in a business unit or two for free.

Why Is NACCO Cheap?

  • Conglomerate discount – Mismatched group of mostly low-margin businesses
  • Volatile stock – High beta (2.74) causes wild price swings – 5 year stock price range is $15-$170!
  • Family ownership – Dual share structure keeps control in the hands of founding families, making it less likely for an activist to influence the company
  • Little analyst coverage – BB&T is the only firm currently covering the stock

History

The original coal business has been around since 1913 (see timeline #1 and #2), and operated exclusively as a mining company for more than 60 years. In the 1980s, the business converted to a holding company operating structure and rapidly expanded:

  • NMHG: Yale forklifts in 1986, followed by Hyster in 1989
  • HBB: ProctorSilex in 1988, followed by Hamilton Beach in 1990
  • KC: Kitchen Collection in 1988; Le Gourmet Chef in 2007

The businesses are run independently by their own management team and board of directors, with the holding company receiving cash proceeds and providing financial help if required.

The company has a dual share structure, with the majority of the super-voting B shares controlled by the CEO and other members of the founding Rankin/Taplin families.

While this voting structure makes it less likely for an activist to gain board seats or force out the executive team, the company seems committed to an open and shareholder-friendly environment.

The company provides a detailed segment breakdown of each operating unit, going above and beyond what is typical of other conglomerates. This disclosure allows the business to be evaluated on a sum-of-parts basis (see section later in post).

First, some financial data on the consolidated business:

Financial Overview

NC - Financial Overview

Strong Dividend History

NACCO recently became a ‘Dividend Champion,’ after raising its dividend for 26 straight years. The stock now yields 2.4%, and dividends have grown at 6.2% per year for the past twenty years:

NC - Dividend History

Recent Financial Results

Like all industrial businesses, NACCO struggled during the recession.

Due to NC’s acquisition spree, a significant portion of goodwill was built up on the balance sheet, and the sales drop forced the company to take a $434m non-cash goodwill impairment charge, as the stock price fell to a low of $15 during the first quarter of 2009.

However, 2010 and 2011 showed a sharp increase in revenues and operating profits across all of the business units – TTM sales of $3.2B are up almost $1B from the 2009 lows.

Financials in Context

Looking at the business holistically, consolidated net income margins are low (3%), and the long-run average ROE and ROIC of 6.25% and 7% are not impressive.

However, the management team underwent a number of initiatives during the latest downturn to reposition the business lines and cut costs – and these improvements have shown in the latest financial results.

Consider this table:

NC - Relative Performance

The stock is trading for less than ½ of the average multiple during the latest upswing in the cycle (2003-2006) despite significant improvements to the business.

In fact, the market is still valuing NC at a discount to 2008 (2008 EV/EBIT was 6.96) despite a better industry outlook, improved efficiency metrics and a stronger financial position.

While the valuation is compelling, the combined company probably deserves to trade at a low multiple (with the ‘conglomerate discount’ effect in mind), but the current discount is grossly overdone, presenting an attractive entry point.

Even better, NC is solid on another, more important factor: cash flow generation: 

NC - FCF by Business Segment

This stable cash flow is a requirement for a stock with such a strong dividend history – as the chart shows, there are differences in each business segment’s ability to throw off cash.

Segment Overview

Kitchen Collections (KC)

  • Specialty retailer under the Kitchen Retailer & Le Gourmet Chef Brands, primarily in outlet mall locales; 300+ locations
  • Business unit continues to struggle, with little or no earnings and low FCF generation over past 10 years
  • Store count continues to rise, although management has said they are aggressively closing underperforming stores

I’m assigning little or no value to this division.

Hamilton Beach Brands (HBB)

  • Manufactures leading household appliances such as blenders, coffee makers, and toasters; Sells primarily through retail locations such as Wal*Mart & Target, along with online through Amazon
  • #1 or #2 market share in over 30 product categories
  • Highest operating margins in the group, with target of 10% going forward

Although consumer confidence and unemployment continue to hold back HBB’s target market, the division has shown remarkable ability to generate consistent free cash flow well in excess of earnings.

North American Coal (NACC)

  • Largest miner of lignite coal, and 7th largest coal producer nationwide
  • Over 2.1b in coal reserves, with 1.2b committed to customers under long-term contracts
  • Cost-plus profit per ton contract with no coal market price risk (due to flammable nature, lignite is not exported and therefore is not subject to wide swings in coal prices); many contracts are renewable up to 2045;

NACC works very closely with the power plant to guarantee a consistent source of coal reserves – basically lending out their operational expertise and access to the reserves.

For unconsolidated mines, the customer funds most of the capex expense, with the debt non-recourse to NACC.

NACCO Material Handling Group (NMHG)

As the largest portion of revenue – and the most cyclical – NMHG really drives the company’s overall results.

NMHG markets both Hyster and Yale brands lift trucks and fork lifts, and is the 3rd or 4th largest brand globally (with approx. 9% market share) behind Toyota, Kion, and Jungheinrich. In the U.S., NMHG controls roughly 21% of the market.

Lift truck sales are dependent on the economy and are very cyclical – the industry has shown strong growth coming out of the recession.

However, upside remains, as U.S. sales would need to increase 32% to reach the long-term average… 

NC - US Lift Truck Shipments

…while worldwide sales are still 23% below the 2007 peak. 

NC - Worldwide Lift Truck Shipments

The sharp jump in shipments has translated into strong results for NHMG in 2011, as revenues were $1.8b through the first nine months of the year, up 51% over the prior period.

While this torrid growth will slow, there still remains a significant backlog of orders (25.6k in Q3 ’11, up 4.5% over Q3 ’10), that will flow through the sales figures in the next several quarters.

While 2012 will be facing tough comps after such a good year in 2011, I think the market is misinterpreting the cycle, as there still seems to be room to run for this division.

NHMG has a powerful brand, which is helped by having the lowest cost of ownership in the business, and management has reiterated on conference calls that they have been able to pass along price increases to their customer base.

Sum-of-the-Parts Valuation

Nacco Industries - Sum of the Parts Valuation

The SOTP analysis clearly shows NMHG’s driving effect on the total company valuation, as the difference between the bull and bear case for that division is ~$470m.

With a current enterprise value of ~900m, the market is basically throwing in KC (negligible impact) and NACC (a consistent cash-flow positive business with growth prospects) for free.

Catalysts

  • Spinoff or sale of business units – management had explored the possibility of spinning off the HBB unit in 2007, before pulling the plug due to deteriorating market conditions. I’d prefer a divesture of the underperforming KC division, but recent spin-offs (ITT, Fortune Brands, etc) could serve as a blueprint to follow. I think it’s likely for management to revisit this strategy.
  • Share Buyback – In the latest quarter, management announced a $50m share buyback, the first significant buyback in 15 years. The buyback would cover roughly 550-600k shares, or 6% of shares outstanding. If executed fully, that would be a significant number over the next 12 months.
  • Further upswing in the NMHG cycle – Continued order flow in the forklift business as demand returns to the long-term average. Final closure of retail side helps remove distraction and drag on earnings.
  • Upcoming coal projects – Several new coal projects will significantly boost capacity (Liberty Mine, 4.2m tons annually starting in 2013; Camino Real Fuels, 2.7m tons annually starting in mid-to-late 2012). Top-line growth should resume in 2012, and margins should pick-up after rough winter and plant shutdowns in impacted 2011 results.

Disclosure

Long NC

 

Business school is an all-consuming endeavor, and I’ve been involved in a number of stock pitch competitions that have required a significant portion of my free time. After winning our internal competition, my team represented UNC at the Alpha Challenge on November 18.

Each team develops two pitches for the event – both a long and short investment idea – out of the provided list of companies (40 names in total). The teams then give a fifteen minute presentation on both ideas, followed by a ten minute Q & A session with the judges. You can check out the event rules here.

Although we didn’t make the finals this time, it was a great experience.

A Few Notes

  • The industry chosen for this year’s event was residential home construction, which was an extremely difficult industry for me. It is very cyclical, and I think everyone is aware of what happened in the real estate markets in the U.S. and around the world over the past several years…
  • Macro trends have a huge impact: unemployment figures, mortgage lending rates, population growth, regulatory environment, etc. – all areas that are outside of my normal circle of competence.
  • The industry is also complex: there are a ton of variables that separate the various homebuilders: country (big difference between the U.S. and Brazil real estate markets for example), size of their land bank, type of dwelling, location, inventory make-up, etc. It took a ton of research to even understand how these companies make money.
  • Standard valuation methods are challenging: Homebuilders have enormous working capital requirements (see this data set for perspective), as they are constantly investing in new land for the next round of building. This means that homebuilders in growth mode report negative FCF numbers – but the companies can decide at basically any point to reduce this investment and swing to a huge positive figure (as existing inventory is converted into cash). Forecasting these trends is difficult.

Our Presentation

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On the Cyrela short:

  • Brazil’s recent growth is pretty amazing, as the economy has come roaring back from the recession. There is still a huge housing shortage, and the government seems committed to the housing program (assuming that they can actual build homes cheap enough to qualify – not as easy as it seems with construction costs rising so rapidly).
  • Total debt as a percentage of GDP is still low, but consumers are showing signs of being overextended: for the average Brazilian consumer, debt payments consume 26% of household income vs. only 17% in the U.S. right before the recession.
  • Although a massive crash is unlikely, even a small correction in the over-heated market would affect the Brazilian homebuilders, and we felt that Cyrela was the most exposed.
On the TW long:
  • Taylor Wimpey’s merger in 2007 was probably a decent idea, but was absolutely horrendous timing. Since then, the company has made a ton of improvements and re-focused their business strategy.
  • The UK market will likely be flat over the near future, and Taylor is one of the cheapest homebuilders over there.
  • The valuation gap between TW and its peers should close as the stigma from the merger and recapitalization fade – if housing recovers sooner, there is significantly more upside.

Conclusion

Two more weeks until the first semester ends – it has been insanely busy, but it’s supposed to slow down soon (although my internship search is in full swing!). I hope to get back to more investing and writing after the holidays.

And finally, a big shout-out to my team for putting in a ton of hours and long nights on the presentation.

Disclosure

No positions.

As a student in UNC’s full-time MBA program, I was recently selected to participate in the Cornell MBA Stock Pitch Competition, one of the premier business school investment management events.

I’m happy to announce that our team was voted as a finalist in the competition (a great showing for UNC!), although we ended up losing out to NYU and Wharton in the finals. Some background on the event:

Cornell MBA Stock Pitch Competition

Teams from each school are provided a list of stocks at 11am on Thursday, and 3 powerpoint stock pitches are due by midnight – trust me when I say that it’s a wild 12 hours.

The pitches are then presented on Friday morning in front of portfolio managers at buy-side institutions like Fidelity (the lead sponsor), American Century, and Putnam Investments.

Each pitch is 10 minutes long, with a 5 min Q/A afterwards, and teams can recommend a long, short, or hold on each individual stock.

Our choices:

Every team was required to pitch the same stock in the first round, and then could pick one stock out of the lists for each of the two subsequent rounds.

Round 1: Required – GMCR

Round 2: Advertising – LAMR, CCO, IPG

Round 3: Asset Managers – FII, TROW, LM, WDR

Can anyone guess the stock I ended up pitching?

Although my investment philosophy has been refined over time, my process has always centered on finding businesses that are mispriced in some capacity.

I’ve had the most success among the deep value stocks found in the microcap realm, but I can also appreciate buying great businesses at fair prices – even if those businesses are outside of the normal ‘value investing’ metrics.

Even with this open mindset, I find that some businesses are trading at such high prices that I couldn’t even imagine the possibility of investing there…

Enter Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR)

GMCR is probably the ultimate anti-value investing stock – the company is selling at a P/E of 70x, has negative free cash flow, heavy insider selling – the list goes on.

At the same time, it is expected to grow 100% in the next year and has been one of the fastest growing companies over the past five. Due to these and many other factors, it is probably one of the most controversial stocks anywhere (outside of maybe NFLX).

To make it even harder, David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital fame just unveiled a scathing 110-page powerpoint presentation on the stock at the recent Value Investing Congress, causing a 40% sell-off in the last month or so.

As a team we decided that we wouldn’t be able to add anything unique or original to Einhorn’s presentation in such a short period of time, and therefore decided to go long GMCR  (I know, I know).

We ended up splitting up the responsibilities so each team member worked on an individual stock, and the GMCR assignment fell to me – which is ironic since the stock is pretty much on the complete opposite end of my normal investment universe.

Anyways, here is what I was able to put together in 12 hours:

[scribd id=71858347 key=key-1ncntt511qdf6t0vzcpr mode=list]

Lessons Learned

Although it was very difficult to put myself in the mindset of someone who could be long GMCR, I think it was a great exercise that will improve my overall investing approach. A few lessons from the experience:

  • Buying behavior – how does it apply to a company’s products?
  • Growth dynamics – what combination of factors leads to such explosive growth?
  • Acquisition strategy – can buying up competitors ever be strategic enough to ignore fundamentals?
  • Identifying the opposing rationale – are all alternative viewpoints explained by the investment thesis?
  • Valuation – how to value high-growth companies with little or no cash flow?
  • Investment Thesis – how to synthesize vast amounts of information into the key points within a tight time window?

The greatest investors not only have the fortitude to follow a strategy during difficult times, but the ability to incorporate divergent viewpoints. I want to make sure that I stay open to other investing styles as I develop in my investing career.

Analyzing a stock – especially an extreme case like GMCR – from such an uncomfortable viewpoint provided a great deal of perspective. I hope to carry these lessons into future investment decisions.

Even so, I won’t be buying GMCR anytime soon. 🙂

Disclosure

No positions.